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Introduction
An international agreement like the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade' (GATT) ultimately must be judged at the community level. 2 In
villages, towns, and cities, real people work, play, and raise children. It is
* Michael H. Shuman is the director of the Institute for Policy Studies, author of
TowARs A GLOBAL VILLAGE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INrrIATIVES
(1994), and co-author of SECuRrrY WITH=U WAR: A PosT-COLu WAR FOREIGN POuC
(1993).
The author wishes to thank the following people for their helpful comments on early
drafts of this essay: Neil Allison, Peter Andreas, Dan Blank, Jeanne Brisken, Richard
Caplan, John Cavanagh, Hillary French, Patti Goldman, Edward Goldsmith, Jed Greer,
Tom Hilliard, Allen Hunter, John Ikenberry, David Korten, Saul Landau, Garreth
Porter, Mark Ritchie, Richard Sclove, WilliamJ. Snape III, Peter Spiro, Steve Wolfson,
and Daphne Wysham.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATr, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS [hereinafter B.I.S.D.], 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT].
2. The word "community" is used here to mean the jurisdiction of political and
legal power most accessible to citizens. Usually, this is synonymous with a city, town, or
village. A neighborhood within a municipality, such as Russian Hill in San Francisco,
might also be considered a community if the city has given it meaningful power.
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there where they encounter most directly the actual effects-both good
and bad-of so-called "free trade." Contrary to the predictions of most
neoclassical economists, the rapid mobility of goods and capital across the
planet, which the Uruguay Round of GAIT will greatly accelerate, poses a
growing threat to every community's quality of life. While one can imag-
ine a GATT agreement that would enhance community life, the Uruguay
Round does just the opposite: it thwarts local economic development,
promotes the unsustainable use of local resources, and undermines local
self-determination. Communities of the world need to recognize the
problems posed by the Uruguay Round and mobilize political resources to
undo it or, failing that, to demand negotiation of a more community-
friendly GATT.
In recent years the internationalization of once local corporations has
placed a growing number of communities in a terrible dilemma: either
cut wages, eviscerate environmental standards, and offer tax breaks to
induce corporations to build new factories or offices, or prepare to
become an economic ghost town. Almost every U.S. town or city has
learned that capital flight is not just a hypothetical danger. According to
estimates by Barry Bluestone of the University of Massachusetts at Boston,
decisions by corporations to move to other states or overseas resulted in
the loss of 22.3 million jobs between 1969 and 1976 and 32-38 million jobs
in the 1970s.3 Most of these displaced workers ultimately found new jobs,
but they had to accept pay cuts and lower quality work.4 States and cities
have responded to corporate mobility by offering lavish incentive packages
for corporations to stay in or relocate to their locales. For example, to
induce Diamond Star Motors, a joint venture between Mitsubishi and
Chrysler, to build an automobile assembly plant in Bloomington, Illinois,
in 1985, Illinois offered $276 million in aid and tax breaks and Blooming-
ton offered another $10 million of land and $20 million in local tax abate-
ments-a total of almost $28,000 per newjob.5 Indiana paid $50,000 per
job to convince Subaru-Isuzu to open a factory in Lafayette.6
Multinational corporations have become increasingly adept at pitting
state and local governments throughout the world against one another. In
1992, for example, the German automaker BMW simultaneously courted
South Carolina and Nebraska as possible locations for a new assembly
plant that would cost $250-300 million and produce 2,000jobs. 7 Nebraska
offered a benefits package worth $100 million; South Carolina topped it
with an offer worth $150 million and won the deal. Although the greater
incentives certainly played a role in BMW's choice, the decisive factor may
have been South Carolina's historic low wages and hostility to unions. The
3. Barry Bluestone, Deindustrialization and Unemployment in America, REv. OF BLACK
POL. EcoN., Fall 1988, at 31.
4. BENNETT HARUSON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TuoRN: COPRPORATE
RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERicA 5 (1988).
5. Robert B. Reich, Who Is Them?, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 77, 85.
6. Id.
7. DONALD L. BAL.E-rr &JAMFs B. STEE E, AMFwcA: WHO REALLY PAYS THE TAXES?
299-306 (1994).
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average manufacturing wage in South Carolina, which BMW ultimately
paid, was $10 per hour, $7 less per hour than that received by the average
U.S. auto worker and $13 less than that earned by the average German
auto worker.
Most of the influence corporations wield over state and local laws,
however, is more subtle. State legislators and city council members, under
steady barrage by corporate-supported think tanks and economists, have
become convinced that the key to "global competitiveness" is to "get gov-
ernment off the backs of private enterprise." This translates into fewer
legal protections for union.activities, lower minimum wages, looser envi-
ronmental standards, and greater obstacles to consumer-product lawsuits.
No piece of legislation or voter initiative protecting workers, the environ-
ment, or consumers can proceed very far without opponents warning
about the adverse consequences for the local "business climate." Unfortu-
nately, the warnings are often correct: the global economy inevitably
means that every community effort to improve its quality of life may under-
mine its ability to attract or hold on to corporations. Communities
throughout the world are now caught in a downward spiral of ever lower
wages and environmental standards-a competition in which there are no
winners.
What alternatives do communities have? How can they increase their
leverage over mobile corporations and regain control over their econo-
mies? Is there a way communities can ensure themselves full employment,
ecological sustainability, economic justice, and broad democratic
participation?
Ultimately, a long-term solution to capital mobility and community
disempowerment is to force corporations to adhere to tough, enforceable
international standards protecting workers, consumers, and the environ-
ment that no jurisdiction-regional, national, state, or local-can under-
cut. This could be done either by appending a "social charter" to the
GATT, like that adopted by the European Union,8 or by negotiating a sep-
arate international treaty governing corporate conduct. The Clinton
Administration has shown rhetorical sensitivity to this goal by suggesting
that the next GAiT round should address labor and environmental con-
cerns.9 But even with an unprecedented transnational organizing effort
by labor unions, environmentalists, and communities, it will be at least five
to ten years before these kinds of legal instruments could be enacted and
another decade before the inevitable kinks in enforcement are worked
out. There is no reason to expect that the learning curve for multilateral
efforts to control corporate misbehavior will be much shorter than the
five-decade learning curve for the GATT itself. Yet communities face
8. Benn Steil, "Social Correctness" Is the New Protectionism: Labor and Free Trade, FoR-
EIGN AFt., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 14.
9. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor, Keynote Address, Symposium on
International Labor Standards and Global Economic Integration, Department of
Labor, Apr. 25, 1994.
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problems that call for urgent attention. They cannot afford to wait half a
century to halt the destruction of their economies.
Unfortunately, the Uruguay Round moves the world away from a
global code of conduct. It puts restraints on government, not corpora-
tions. It gives private enterprises license to relocate their factories and to
sell their products practically anywhere while substantially limiting the
power of public institutions to control these transactions. It weakens the
power of governmental authorities at all levels to regulate the safety of
goods and services. It forecloses many possibilities for public bodies to
enter the marketplace as buyers, sellers, producers, or financers. It creates
a powerful World Trade Organization (WTO) that can develop rules gov-
erning trade and product regulation without democratic decision-making
or rudimentary due process. And it says virtually nothing about protecting
workers, the environment, or communities. In short, it creates a global
framework for crude, laissez-faire capitalism akin to the depression-prone
policies of Herbert Hoover.
Perhaps the most insidious feature of the GATT is that it systemati-
cally strips communities of powers they might otherwise use to protect
themselves against the adverse effects of the global economy. Even with-
out an international corporate code of conduct in place, communities
might be able to influence the behavior of nmultinational firms through
regulations, subsidies, tax abatements, public investments and contracts,
community ownership, and lobbying. The Uruguay Round of the GATT,
however, preempts or weakens nearly all these powers. Once in effect, the
new GATT agreement will lock into place a new economic order that may
permanently relegate communities to the dustbin of history.
I. Living in a GATTIess World
In the absence of an international code of conduct governing multina-
tional corporations, how might communities exercise a modicum of con-
trol over capital mobility? A clear answer to this question is important for
two reasons. First, it suggests some of the survival strategies communities
will need to cope with the global economy, with or without the GATT.
Second, it points to the essential state and local powers a community-
friendly GATT would have to protect.
There are at least five ways communities can reclaim their economic
destiny. First, communities can place regulations on products and corpo-
rations that pass through their jurisdiction. Second, they can choose to
invest municipal monies in and enter contracts with firms that adhere to
high standards. Third, they can anchor corporations to the community by
buying them out or obtaining a major ownership stake. Fourth, they can
delink selectively from the global economy. Finally, they can lobby
national and international institutions for stronger standards governing
corporate behavior.
VoL 27
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A. Regulation 10
One way communities can discipline globe-trotting corporations is to reg-
ulate products passing through their jurisdictions and businesses setting
up shop there. Product regulation is straightforward and common. Many
communities enact tough standards for products bought or sold to protect
public health, safety, welfare, and morals. Sometimes communities also
ban or penalize products that were produced under unacceptable circum-
stances, such as with child or prison labor. But most countries frown upon
these "extraterritorial" ordinances-that is, those that attempt to influ-
ence production methods outside their own jurisdiction-fretting that
they might trigger retaliatory actions or trade wars. The controversial
GATr ruling against the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, which
banned imports of tuna caught with nets that unnecessarily killed dol-
phins, is an example of the hostility of trade regulators to extraterritorial
legislation."
Communities have relatively broad powers to regulate corporations
with plants, offices, and stores located within their jurisdictions. To vary-
ing degrees in different countries, municipalities can enact higher mini-
mum wages, better working conditions, and stronger environmental
standards than those adhered to by their national governments. They can
demand regular reports on energy and resource use or worker health and
safety. Of course, these regulations do not circumvent the original prob-
lem: the more regulations a community imposes, the less likely corpora-
tions will locate there.
Communities, therefore, have sought to develop incentives to induce
corporations to come and stay. According to the Chicago-based Midwest
Center for Labor Research,
during the 1980s, 90 percent of major new plants constructed in the U.S.
and 50 percent of major plant expansions benefitted from one or more
forms of public investment: Industrial Revenue Bonds, Urban Development
Action Grants, Community Development Block Grants, infrastructure
improvements, property tax reductions or abatements, Jobs Training Part-
nership Act funds, or various state funds for financing and training.' 2
States and cities also have sought to deter corporations from leaving
prematurely. The city of Chicago tried to enjoin the parent company of
Playskool in 1983 from shutting down on the grounds that it had promised
not to sell off its assets for twenty years. 13 The case was ultimately settled
out of court, when Playskool promised to keep the plant open one more
10. Much of the information in this section is drawn from: RooE IRasoN & GREo
LEROY, STATE AND LocAL INrrrATrvs ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES AND PLANT CLOSINGS
(1989); and HANY KHALIL, Top 10 PoucY Hrrs OF THE 1980s AND 1990S: PUSHING THE
ENVELOPE (October 1993) (draft, on file with the Comel International Lawjournal).
11. See David Phillips, Dolphins and GA7T, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT,
NAFrA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER 133 (Earth Island Press ed.,
1993).
12. RKESON & LEROY, supra note 10, at 49.
13. KHAUL, supra note 10, at 4.
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year, to set up a job-placement center for unemployed workers, and to
contribute $50,000 to support displaced workers.' 4
After General Motors announced its plans to relocate a plant from
Ypsilanti, Michigan, the city sued to enjoin GM from moving.' 5 A lower
court held that the city had an implied, common-law obligation to com-
pensate the community in return for favorable tax treatment.' 6 A higher
court reversed the ruling,' 7 and the case is now on appeal. The trial court
decision would have been less vulnerable to reversal had the city passed an
ordinance to regulate corporate closures. For example, Ypsilanti might
have demanded that all companies with more than fifty employees provide
at least three months notice and two months pay before closure.' 8 Viola-
tions might be punishable by a fine large enough to enable the city to pay
severance to displaced employees. In fact, between 1979 and 1982 ten
state legislatures considered bills that would have required corporations to
give one to two years of notice to the community before closure.' 9
A local ordinance also might require any corporation shutting down
to offer to sell its factory to the workers or to other investors in the com-
munity. The city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance man-
dating that firms about to close a factory issue an economic impact
statement exploring alternatives, including the possibility of an employee
buyout.20 Washington state considered a "social compact" bill in 1992 that
would have given workers the right of first refusal-the right to purchase a
plant before it is offered for sale to any other party.2 1 Some states have
created special funds to assist worker buyouts: Illinois and Michigan have
revolving loan funds for such purposes, and both states along with Califor-
nia authorize the use of industrial development revenue bonds for
buyouts. 22
Some states go even further and allow state or local governments to
use their powers of eminent domain to take over plants about to be
closed.2 3 The U.S. and state constitutions require that such takeovers
serve a public purpose and the owners receive "just compensation," 24 but
14. 1&
15. Id.
16. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993
WL 132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993).
17. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 557
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
18. The Federal Worker Adjustment, Retraining, and Notification Act (WARN)
requires companies with more than 100 or more employees to give at least two months
notice of a plant shutdown or major layoff. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988).
19. KHAuL, supra note 10, at 5.
20. Id. A Pennsylvania court, however, invalidated the law on the grounds that the
city had exceeded its power. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Council of Pittsburgh, 485 A.2d
73, 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
21. KaLuL, supra note 10, at 4.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compensation can be below (often far below) market value. 25 The states
of Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania permit government takeovers whenever
plant closure or relocation will adversely affect the local economy.2 6 New
Bedford, Massachusetts, prevented the closure of the Morse Cutting Tools
plant when it attempted to take it over, which prompted the owner, Gulf
and Western Corporation, to sell the plant to a third party.27
These restrictions on corporate mobility hardly exhaust the universe
of possibilities. Here are some other examples:
- Any firm in Illinois that receives a state tax abatement is obligated
not to shut down during the period of the abatement or the state will
"clawback" the subsidy and force the firm to pay the entirety of the abate-
ment plus eighteen percent interest.2 8
- A proposed bill in New Jersey would create an Industrial Retention
Commission empowered to deny state subsidies, contracts, and pension
investments to any company found to have hurt local employment
through plant transfer.29
- Maine requires corporations engaged in major takeovers to reinvest
in the state. 30
Altogether, these laws provide a powerful arsenal for local govern-
ments to raise the costs of corporate exit and deter sudden departures.
Once again, however, the limitation of this strategy is obvious: the more
onerous the restrictions, the less likely corporations will set up shop in the
community.
B. Selective Investment and Contracting
One way communities can escape corporate retribution for regulation is
to place financial rewards and punishments on firms not located in the
jurisdiction. This can be done through public investment and contracting
decisions. Most communities invest their surplus revenues and public
employee pension funds, and most buy goods and services and enter into
contracts with private corporations. These proprietary decisions are usu-
ally made based on strictly economic criteria: Which investments will pro-
vide the greatest long-term rate of return? Which goods and services are
the least expensive? Which contractors are the most reliable? Some com-
munities have begun to add political criteria to these decisions, rewarding
well-behaved corporations and punishing poorly behaved ones.
An early example of this occurred in the Netherlands in 1975 when
several Dutch cities convinced Stevin, a major dredging and building firm,
to pull out of Chile after General Augusto Pinochet had overthrown the
25. Recent Supreme Court decisions on takings, however, suggest that states and
cities may have to pay higher levels of compensation. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
26. KHAuL, supra note 10, at 4.
27. Id
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 6.
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elected government of Salvador Allende.3 1 The head of Stevin, which had
signed a 62.5 million dollar contract with Pinochet, defended the deal by
arguing: "It's normal in Chile to change governments by coup d'etat."
3 2
The Chilean community in Holland and the Dutch Labor Party were out-
raged by the comment and called for a boycott. Rotterdam and Haarlem
decided to suspend their contracts with Stevin; other cities were prepared
to follow suit. Afraid of losing the more than fifty percent of its business
dependent on Dutch local governments, Stevin canceled its Chilean work.
Perhaps the most successful use of selective investment and con-
tracting was the sanctions movement against South Africa. Over the last
twenty years hundreds of municipalities worldwide decided to stop invest-
ing in or entering contracts with firms doing business in South Africa. In
the United States a total of 27 states, 25 counties, and 101 cities enacted
sanctions.3 3 These U.S. jurisdictions decided to reinvest more than $20
billion in "clean" firms with no ties to apartheid.3 4 Some U.S. communi-
ties also refused to do their banking with or to buy goods from tainted
companies. The Port of Wilmington, Delaware, refused to unload any
cargo from South Africa.3 5 Once these sanctions were put into effect, two-
thirds of all American companies with ties to South Africa sold off their
equity shares. In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act, mustering the supermajority needed in both legislative
houses to overcome President Ronald Reagan's veto.3 6
An important lesson of the anti-apartheid movement is that a rela-
tively small number of cities can have a dramatic effect on the behavior of
corporations and national politicians. Firms fear the loss of even one
major municipal client, and the prospect of losing hundreds terrifies
them. Congressional legislators, many of whom were once local govern-
ment officials, wish to avoid angering urban constituents. These realities
give communities enormous leverage against corporate irresponsibility,
even if they act alone.
The anti-apartheid campaign was the first time many communities
realized the power their investment and contracting decisions gave them
over corporations. Since then, they have begun to add other political and
moral criteria. By 1987, ten cities and counties in the United States
refused to buy goods from firms involved in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons.3 7 Cottage industries have sprung up to promote "socially
31. MICHAEL H. SHUMAN, ToWARDS A GLOBAL VILLAGE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 32 (1994).
32. Id.
33. The Last Mile-U.S. Communities and South Aflica, GLOBAL COMMUNITIES (Inst. for
Pol'y Stud., Washington, D.C.), Winter 1991-1992, at 1.
34. I& at 2.
35. Wilmington Exec. Order No. 1986-1 (July 3, 1986) (on file with the Cornell Inter-
national LawJourna).
36. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat.
1086 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5117 (1986)).
37. Nuclear Free Zones with Legislation Regarding Nuclear Free Investment and/or Con-
tracting, NUCLEAR FREE AMERICA, Nov. 1987, at 1.
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responsible investment" and "Green purchasing."38
These initiatives could be the beginning of a global social charter
drafted and enacted at the grassroots level. A problem with this kind of
decentralized approach is that ten cities might adopt ten different invest-
ment/purchasing screens and send ten different and possibly contradic-
tory signals to target corporations. But one can imagine progressive cities
worldwide coming together, formulating a standardized code of conduct,
setting up a central clearinghouse of information on corporate behavior,
and agreeing to invest in or to purchase products only from responsible
corporations. A consortium of communities and nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) might attempt to grade corporate behavior, just as
investment houses regularly grade corporate economic performance. Any
firm with a poor rating would be ineligible for municipal business.
One consequence of this strategy might be the emergence of two
global blocs of communities, each endorsing different economic para-
digms and each doing business with different corporations. The
"neoliberal bloc" of communities might enjoy cheaper goods and higher
rates of return from its investments, but it would also have to endure dete-
riorating working conditions and environmental quality. The "socially
responsible bloc" might end up paying inflated prices, but its citizens
would have a higher quality of life.3 9 Even though the communities and
corporations in the latter bloc would start out in the minority, over time,
as more workers in the neoliberal bloc lostjobs and pay, as their problems
from pollution and unsafe products multiplied, as ecology, labor, and
social change organizations emerged to respond to these problems, more
and more neoliberal communities and corporations would probably begin
to choose a better quality of life over obsolete notions of efficiency. The
mere existence of an alternative bloc would give progressive politicians
and activists a concrete goal for organizing.
C. Community Ownership
A more direct way to ensure that corporations do not desert a community
is to root ownership there. If a community owns and operates an enter-
prise, it will only allow the business to relocate if it is clearly in the commu-
nity's interest. An owner deeply connected to a home base will examine
not only rates of return of alternative sites in the abstract but also the
impact of moving on local employment and community life.
There are two reasons why a rational community owner would favor
industrial retention more than a private owner. First, a private owner
looks for the highest rate of return, while a community owner only needs a
38. The Social Investment Forum, for example, is a trade association with more
than 1,000 members. Mark Dowie, Clean, Green and Guilt-Free Funds, THE NATION, Apr.
26, 1993, at 551.
39. The evidence that social responsibility renders firms less competitive is hardly
clear. It "is almost impossible to prove one way or the other" that portfolios with securi-
ties from socially responsible firms perform more poorly than other portfolios. Id. at
554.
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rate of return above zero. In 1975, the Sperry Rand Corporation decided
to shut down a subsidiary called the Library Bureau in Herkimer, New
York, because it was not achieving a rate of return of twenty-two percent,
the ambitious target the parent company had set for all its subsidiaries. 40
Closure of this plant, which employed 250 people, would have decimated
the community. So, the workers and local residents decided to buy the
firm from Sperry Rand. A third of the money was raised by selling shares
of stock, and the remainder came from loans from local banks and the
U.S. Department of Commerce. In its first year of operation under new
management, the firm earned a seventeen percent rate of returnm-a
return inadequate for Sperry Rand but more than enough for this small
community.
Hard-nosed economists might reply that Herkimer would have been
smarter to invest its money in firms like Sperry Rand that were earning
twenty-two percent or more. The problem is that one rarely knows with
certainty what the rate of return on an investment will be. The higher the
return, the higher the risk. It is certainly rational for a community to
invest in a known enterprise in its own backyard which it can improve
through sweat equity and which, in any case, will keep the local economy
moving, than to risk money in an unknown enterprise hundreds or even
thousands of miles away.
There is a second economic reason why a community owner will
retain an industry more diligently than a private owner: to avoid devastat-
ing transition costs. When a company abandons a community, it rarely has
to pay unemployment compensation and welfare benefits. Nor does it
have to figure out how ancillary businesses will be kept alive when fewer
people have jobs or disposable income. It almost never has to cope with
plummeting property values and a depleted tax base that can no longer
support schools, hospitals, street repairs, electric utilities, or police. What
economists reify and dismiss as regrettable "externalities" are in fact signif-
icant enough to motivate a community to prop up a business with even a
negative rate of return. The layoff of thousands of steel workers in
Youngstown, Ohio, in 1977 cost the federal government seventy million
dollars that year in unemployment compensation, welfare payments, lost
taxes, and other costs.4 1 It would have been cheaper for Youngstown, with
federal support, to invest at least seventy million dollars to upgrade the
plant and keep it running.42
There is significant precedent in the United States for community
involvement in the local economy. U.S. state and local governments have
created more than 6,300 public-private partnerships to build highways and
bridges, to run electric and water utilities, to dispose of hazardous wastes,
40. GAR ALPERovmTz &JEF7 FAUX, REBuILDING AMERcIA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW
ECONOMY 149 (1984).
41. Id. at 142-43.
42. The logic for the federal government supporting community bailouts is at least
as strong as that for bailing out major corporations like Chrysler.
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to operate ports, and to perform other services. 43 Because these enter-
prises are typically engaged in public works, it is hard to imagine them
being tempted to move overseas. The New York Transit Authority is unin-
terested in running light-rail transit in Manila. But public authorities also
can acquire or sell industrial plants. Pittsburgh responded to the depar-
ture of its steel factories by creating the Steel Valley Authority, a consor-
tium of workers, the community, and private investors that converted an
old metal-works plant into the City Pride Bakery.44
U.S. state and local governments also have set up special funds to pro-
mote regional economic development.4 5 Twenty-five U.S. states have at
least one venture capital fund to finance enterprises that mainstream
banks deem too risky and promise only long-term returns.46 Michigan has
eight separate financing programs. 47 Many U.S. state and local pension
funds are practicing economically targeted investments (ETIs) within their
regions. 48 The Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association, for
example, plans to place twenty percent of its investments in in-state invest-
ments. 49 Because these public funds generally are given to private firms
that benefit the region, there is still the possibility that the beneficiaries
will take the money and run. A better policy for preventing capital flight,
rarely practiced, is to target public investments in public enterprises.
Of course, public enterprises need not necessarily be run and oper-
ated by local governments. As the examples above suggest, there are many
models for public-private partnership. One alternative is to create a pri-
vately held corporation whose shareholders must be community residents.
Grafting some components of community ownership onto private firms
should be sufficient to convince many of them not to consider moving
away to lower-wage, less responsible communities.
D. Delinking
A fourth strategy for coping with mobile corporations is for communities
to unplug, selectively, from the global economy. Not all community activ-
ists would support this approach. Many critics of the GAIT and the North
American Free Trade Agreement 50 (NAFTA) argued that stronger social
charters might be sufficient to remedy their defects.5 ' The problem is,
however, that even so-called "fair trade" is at odds with self-reliance, and
43. KHAUL, supra note 10, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6-7.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id.
50. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.LM. 605.
51. See, e.g., Jorge G. Castafieda & Carlos Heredia, Another NAFTA: What A Good
Agreement Should Offer, 9 WoRLD POL'YJ. 673 (1992).
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self-reliance is a critical objective for community well-being.5 2 Most com-
munities, if they could do so, would like to provide their citizens with ade-
quate jobs, food, education, health care, and housing without depending
on outside support or creating new problems for those outside of the com-
munity. As Johan Galtung, a leading peace studies theorist, states:
[T]he basic rule of self-reliance is this: produce what you need using
your own resources, internalising the challenges this involves, growing with
the challenges, neither giving the most challenging tasks (positive externali-
ties) to somebody else on whom you become dependent, nor exporting
negative externalities to somebody else to whom you do damage and who
may become dependent on you....
[T]hejustification for so doing is clear we will enjoy the positive exter-
nalities, rather than giving them away, and at the same time will be responsi-
ble ourselves for the negative externalities... We can fight the negative
consequences ourselves, the distance between cause and effect being a
short one.5 3
It is theoretically possible for a community to achieve a desired level
of production and consumption based entirely on its own resources and
then use surplus production for export. But trade almost invariably brings
with it specialization and draws resources away from the production of
goods and services that some citizens might regard as essential for local
self-reliance. Moreover, the financial flows necessary to sustain imports
and exports, which are typically overseen by outside traders, banks, and
arbitragers, create leakages in the local economy. These problems are
exacerbated when trade is unfair-when low-wage, environmentally irre-
sponsible jurisdictions can produce cheap goods that undercut local prod-
ucts. For all these reasons, a community may well decide that the best way
to create a robust economic future is to maximize local self-reliance and to
minimize trade. There are four overlapping means that communities
might employ to accomplish this.
The first and crudest is to impose legal barriers against trade. At one
extreme a community might forbid the entry of any foreign goods into its
jurisdiction. Absolute protectionism, however, is hard to enforce; coer-
cive, goods-confiscating checkpoints would be needed at every community
entrance. It is also largely irrelevant, since smart producers will gladly set
up shops selling foreign goods close to the borders of protectionist com-
munities, and smart consumers within those communities will gladly
purchase goods at the border stores.54 Placing tariffs on foreign goods
52. See Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Obstacle of
Free Trade, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CORPORATE POWER 121 (1993).
53. Johan Galtung, Towards a New Economics: On the Theoiy and Practice of Self-Reli-
ance, in THE LIVING ECONoY. A NEW ECONOMICS IN THE MAUNG 101 (Paul Ekins ed.,
1986).
54. Protectionism also carries a moral hazard. In rural Arkansas, there is a county
where the anti-liquor laws have remained in effect because of assiduous lobbying by the
main church located there. A closer look, however, reveals that the county is hardly
dry-liquor stores located on the borders maintain a thriving business. The rumor is
that the liquor stores contribute generously to the church's lobbying efforts. Interview
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entering a community is less burdensome but still carries problems con-
cerning coercion, enforcement, and circumvention. Perhaps the best a
community can do is to label foreign goods as such and convince residents
of the virtues of voluntarily buying local goods. The essential argument is
this: Spending a little more on locally baked bread is worth the benefits of
keeping community bakers employed, who in turn will spend their money
nearby and pump up the local economy.
A second way to achieve greater self-reliance is to create and support
diverse local industries. Through community subsidies or community-
ownership measures discussed previously, localities can assert greater con-
trol over their own economies. A community-owned and operated bank-
ing system, for example, might ensure that deposits were reinvested locally
rather than in distant countries.
A third option is to establish a local monetary system. A community
currency, whether in the form of real coins and paper or government-
tallied credits and debits, provides a means of counting, legitimating, and
encouraging transactions involving local goods and services. A local gov-
ernment might serve as a central bank, distributing the currency and set-
ting rules for how it can be used. It might disallow exchanges of local
currency for national currency except at specially designated banks that
use legally fixed exchange rates. A mark of good local citizenship would
be to perform work only for local currency or to use local currency as
much as possible for needed purchases.
A final means to increase self-reliance is to use local natural resources
more efficiently. Investment in solar and wind energy production can pre-
vent the costs of depending on foreign supplies of uranium, coal, oil, or
gas, or importing electricity derived from these fuels. Investment in local
agriculture and greenhouses can reduce food imports. Investment in
technologies for water conservation can reduce the need for diverting dis-
tant rivers or depleting nearby water tables. Recycling wastes can elimi-
nate the need for the importation of steel, copper, plastic, glass, and
rubber.
Skeptics argue that the absence of communities that have achieved
total self-reliance means that the goal is unattainable and unrealistic. But
the real goal should be to achieve as high a degree of self-reliance as possi-
ble. As communities acquire more wealth, as they grow politically bolder
in their willingness to redistribute resources, as they increasingly adopt
appropriate technologies, they will be able to become much more self-
reliant than they are today. All that is necessary is political will-and legal
power.
E. Lobbying
A final approach that communities should use to discipline global corpo-
rations is persuasion and politicking. Local governments, working with
with David Orr, Director of the Meadowcreek Project in Arkansas, in Fox, Ark. (Jan. 20,
1988).
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citizen groups, can learn from their corporate colleagues and mobilize
resources to press national and international bodies to act with greater
sensitivity to local interests. They can orchestrate citizen pressure through
education, debates, films, newspapers, and letter-writing campaigns. They
can set up lobbying offices in national capitals and key cities abroad like
Brussels, Geneva, and Tokyo. They can try to unseat politicians who are
unsympathetic with the community agenda and organize support for pro-
community candidates.
It is ironic that "nonpolitical" institutions like private corporations
have no qualms about trying to influence national decision-makers while
"political" institutions like local governments are inclined to steer clear of
politics. Seeing themselves as subservient to national policies and believ-
ing they lack the "competence" to address international concerns, many
local officials are reluctant to express their opinions over the shape of the
global economy.
A recent survey in the United States revealed that the country's 36,000
municipalities have deployed a total of 116 registered lobbyists in Wash-
ington, D.C.5 5 Most U.S. cities see no need to hire lobbyists because they
expect their advocacy to be performed by the National League of Cities
(NLC) and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, which receive millions of dol-
lars in municipal dues. But the NLC has only nine lobbyists, and the U.S.
Conference of Mayors has only five. 56 With the attention of these lobbyists
split on hundreds of issues, it is easy to see how they can become over-
whelmed. For example, even though most U.S. cities recognize the value
of cutting Pentagon spending and rechanneling the savings back to
municipal needs, they have deployed only a handful of lobbyists to press
the issue. In contrast, the top twenty-five defense contractors have 265
registered lobbyists on Capitol Hill working around the clock to protect
and expand the military's coffers.57
Outside the United States the problem is much worse. The U.S. Con-
stitution at least protects the rights of local governments to lobby.5 8 Other
countries with stronger central governments are free to obstruct dissent-
ing local voices altogether. In the 1980s, when the Greater London Coun-
cil and other Labour-run local councils sought to counter the Thatcher
revolution, the Tories simply abolished them.5 9
If communities are to regain their economic independence, they
must formulate and amplify their views on a new Bretton Woods order.
They must hold annual hearings on how the global economy is affecting
their local economies and how they could constructively change the global
economy. The hearings might lead to a "State of the City in the World"
55. Main Street U.S.A.-Lobby or Lose It, GLOBAL COMMUNITIES (Inst. for Pol'y Stud.,
Washington, D.C.), Autumn 1991, at 1.
56. 1& at 5.
57. Id. at 4.
58. The First Amendment, for instance, grants every American, including repre-
sentatives of communities, the right of free speech. U.S. CONsr. amend I.
59. SHuMAN, supra note 31, at 66.
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booklet, laying out a community policy agenda for the coming year, which
would be distributed to every resident. Local governments might send
paid lobbyists to their national ministries and legislators, as well as to the
decision-making bodies of the GATT, the World Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), to push for this agenda. Whatever commu-
nities do, it will be better than continuing their collective silence and
effectively allowing corporate voices to monopolize the debate over new
rules for the world economy.
II. A Community Friendly GATT
What might a community-friendiy trade agenda look like? Communities
would be well-served if the GATT, or any other trade agreement, were
built upon six principles. The first is to set minimum standards for corpo-
rate behavior concerning product safety, worker rights and wages, and
environmental protection. It also would be helpful if international guide-
lines were developed concerning the disclosure of crucial pieces of corpo-
rate information, such as the health records of employees, natural
resource inputs, pollution outputs, tax payments, labor relations, and
plant closure history. Over time, international rules might outlaw monop-
olist and oligopolist behavior, hold trustees and managers criminally liable
for egregious acts, and require a certain percentage of seats on every
board to be held by labor and community representatives. In sum, the
central tenet of most trade agreements-that corporations should be
freed and public institutions constrained-needs to be reversed. Corpo-
rate charters should be seen, not as natural rights, but as public privileges
contingent upon responsible behavior in every community they effect.60
A second principle is that standards enunciated by trade agreements
should be floors, not ceilings, for regulation. Any country, state, or local-
ity that wishes to enact higher minimum wages, tougher environmental
standards, or more rigorous information-disclosure requirements should
be free to do so. The only free trade test should be this: Are the regula-
tions being applied evenhandedly to foreign and domestic firms? If so,
the regulation should stand. This is the principal test that U.S. courts use
to enforce the proscription of the Constitution against states infringing on
interstate or international commerce.61
A third principle is that selective investment and contracting by pub-
lic bodies should be viewed as proprietary business decisions and left
entirely free. Just as corporations, nonprofit organizations, churches, and
individuals may decide where to invest, with whom to contract, and what
to purchase, so should states and municipalities. It seems perverse that
neoclassical economists touting the central importance of "choice" would
deny government officials the ability to make market choices themselves.
60. For an elaboration of this argument, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept; 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1980).
61. See., eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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A fourth principle is to allow the use of government subsidies, except
in the rare instance when subsidies are being used to destroy international
competition. As economists have long pointed out, Americans should
applaud decisions by other governments to subsidize industries. Every for-
eign subsidy means cheaper products for American consumers and the
opportunity to invest the savings in our own industries. If the Japanese
want to sell $10 television sets, why should we refuse to buy them? The
popular counterargument is that, as soon as the Japanese wipe out the
U.S. television industry, they will raise prices and gouge American consum-
ers. This argument overlooks the fact that whenever television prices
exceed competitive levels, Americans once again will have incentives to set
up their own television manufacturers. Only in instances where it is very
expensive to set up a competitive television factory, where the costs of
entry are very high, will the Japanese subsidies successfully suppress U.S.
competition. It makes more sense to outlaw these specific instances
through global antitrust laws than to eliminate all government interven-
tions in the marketplace. Free trade within the United States functions
quite well without any significant limitations on public subsidies.
Subsidies are essential tools for responsible governance. If a national,
state, or local government wishes to support certain industries or provide
incentives for certain kinds of research and development, it should be free
to do so. Whether the costs of such subsidies, (e.g., taxpayer dollars spent
and reduced competition) are worth the benefits, such as a more predict-
able economic environment for consumers and producers, should be left
to each jurisdiction. Moreover, every government should have the ability
to set up public enterprises if it believes that they are more responsible to
the common good than private corporations.
A fifth principle is that community self-reliance should be seen as a
legitimate objective of government regulation, just as local health, safety,
morality, and environmental protection should be. The policies suggested
earlier provide some examples of how community self-reliance can be bal-
anced with free trade. If communities use labels and a local currency to
make it easier for their citizens to identify and purchase local goods, they
are not really infringing on trade. They are simply helping consumers to
choose more wisely. Moreover, public investments that enable local
resources to be recycled or used more efficiently do not forbid outside
imports of energy, water, or food; they merely are making it unnecessary
and unattractive for consumers to rely on such imports.
A final principle is that no national or international rules of trade
should be adopted unless communities are part of the process. This might
be called the democracy principle. A system of fair representation would
ensure that the voices of all people, and not just those of special interests,
are heard. All decision-making would be open. Dispute-resolution proce-
dures would respect standards of due process.
It is certainly possible to conceive of a GATT that conformed to these
six principles. Such an agreement would eliminate tariffs and most other
barriers to trade, create a code of conduct for corporations, and yet still
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allow communities to shape their own economies. The regime produced
by the Uruguay Round, however, amounts to little more than a corporate
bill of rights that respects none of these principles.
MI. GATTadysmic Effects on Communities
The GATT not only fails to put meaningful controls on multinational cor-
porations but takes away from communities the essential powers they need
to cope with them. Communities worldwide should insist on having broad
powers to regulate product sales and factory mobility, to provide subsidies
or tax breaks to corporations, to invest and contract selectively, to create
community owned and operated businesses and banks, to label local
goods, to create local currencies, to rely on local natural resources, and to
lobby. Most local governments outside the United States have only a few
of these powers. U.S. states and communities have many of these powers,
at least in theory, but are reluctant to exercise them.62 The most distres-
sing reality about the GATT is that the possibility of communities discover-
ing and expanding their powers is about to be destroyed before they even
realize what is at stake.
A. Product Regulation
The GATT essentially sets ceilings, not floors, for local government regula-
tions concerning product safety. The Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 63 (SPS), which governs the regula-
tion of food and beverages, requires a national government to adopt inter-
national standards, unless it can demonstrate a "scientific justification" for
tougher standards. Such justification may be found "if, on the basis of an
examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conform-
ity with the relevant portions of this Agreement, a Member determines
that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations
are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of protection." 64 In any
event, a Member is obligated to ensure that its standards "take into
account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects." 65 Unfortu-
nately, the international standards and cost-benefit protocols recognized
by the GATr are set by Codex Alimentarius and other bodies which are
62. For example, the emerging "market participant" exception to the Commerce
Clause suggests that selective contracting and selective investing by states and munici-
palities may be immune from constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. City
of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
63. Agreement on the Application of Sanitay and Phytosanitazy Measures, GAIT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4, paras. 6, 9 [hereinafter Agreement on SPS], in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Uruguay
Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), reprinted in OmcE or
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
64. Id para. 11, n.2.
65. Id. para. 19.
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heavily influenced by the industries they are supposed to regulate.66 The
practical result is that looser international standards have the potential to
displace stronger national, state, and local standards. National govern-
ments are obligated to refrain from encouraging "regional or non-govern-
mental entities, or local governmental bodies, to act in a manner
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 67
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade" (TBT) places simi-
lar rules on measures that regulate "[a]ll products, including industrial
and agricultural products." Once again, "[wihere technical regulations
are required and relevant international standards exist or their comple-
tion is imminent, Members shall use them ... "69 Even where interna-
tional standards do not exist, "technical regulations shall not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective ... "70 and
"Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them
to ensure compliance by [local governments]."71
B. Corporate Regulation
How the GATI will affect community efforts to limit mobility by corpora-
tions is unclear. Incentives that induce corporations to stay in a commu-
nity could be deemed trade-damaging subsidies.72 Measures that punish
corporations for departing prematurely might be viewed as protectionist if
they burden, as many do, foreign-owned corporations more seriously than
domestically-owned ones.7s
1 66. Codex meetings held between 1989 and 1991 involved more than 2,500 partici-
pants; approximately twenty-five percent came from industry and only one percent
came from public interest groups. Eighty-one percent of the "nongovernmental" repre-
sentatives on national delegations also came from industry. TIM LANG & COUN HINEs,
THE NEw PROTEcTrONsM: PROTECTING THE FuTURE AcANsr Fam TRADE 101 (1993).
67. Agreement on SPS, supra note 63, para. 45.
68. Agreement on Technical Barrers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-6, art. 1.3(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Agreement on TBT1, in Uruguay Round, supra note 63.
69. Id. art. 2.4.
The Administrative Practice language promulgated by the Clinton Administration
states:
No standards-related activities shall be deemed to constitute an unnecessary
obstacle to the international trade of the United States if the demonstrable
purpose of the standards-related activity is to achieve a legitimate domestic
objective, including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or
safety, essential security, environmental or consumer interests, and if such activ-
ity does not operate to exclude imported products which fully meet the objec-
tives of such activity.
Statement of Administrative Action, attach. 2-1, in URUGuAY ROUND TR Ean AGREEMENTS,
TEXTs OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND
REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 792 (1994).
Nevertheless, the World Trade Organization might still conclude that the plain lan-
guage of the GATT requires the adoption of international standards.
70. Agreement on TBT, supra note 68, art. 2.2. "[L]egitimate objectives are, inter alia,
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment." Id.
71. Id. art. 3.1. See also id. arts. 3, 7.
72. See infra part III.E.
73. GATT, supra note 1, art. 3.
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C. Selective Investment
The GATT leaves intact some but not all community investment choices.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) exempts "services
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority,"74 which include
"activities forming part of a statutory system of social security or public
retirement plans."75 This suggests that pension funds for municipal
employees can still be invested creatively. Selective investment of surplus
city revenues, however, might be viewed as a prohibited subsidy under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures76 (SCM). A sub-
sidy, under the agreement, includes a "[g]overnment practice [that]
involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infu-
sion)." 77 The GATT prohibitions on subsidies, as discussed below, are
broad enough to invalidate almost any municipal assistance for
corporations.
D. Selective Contracting
The GATr will have some impact on state government purchasing and
contracting decisions but very little on those of local governments. The
Agreement on Government Procurement, a plurilateral accord which will
go into effect on January 1, 1996, sets out a panoply of specific rules con-
cerning the bidding, negotiating, and acceptance of public contracts. 78
Section 1 of Article 3 of the Procurement Agreement prohibits govern-
ment agencies from discriminating against foreign providers of products,
suppliers, and services in general or against other signatories to the Agree-
ment.79 A strict interpretation of this provision would forbid "Buy Ameri-
can" rules. Had it been in effect during the 1980s and had South Africa
been a signatory of the Procurement Agreement, it also would have out-
lawed the policies of various state agencies that did not allow firms tied to
South Africa to bid on public contracts.
Section 2, however, introduces several ambiguities: "Parties shall
ensure.., that their entities shall not treat a locally-established supplier or
service provider less favourably than another locally-established supplier
or service provider on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or owner-
ship."8 0 Moreover, "entities shall not discriminate against locally-estab-
lished suppliers or service providers on the basis of the country of
production of the good or service being supplied, provided that the coun-
try of production is a Party to the Agreement ... .8 1 Does this section
74. GeralAgremet on Trade in Serice GATr Doc. MTN/FA II-AIB, art. I, § 3(c)
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter GATS], in Uruguay Round, supra note 63.
75. Id., Annex on Financial Services, § 1.2.2.
76. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATr Doc. MTN/FA/II-13
(Dec. 15, 1993), [hereinafter Agreement on SCM], in Uruguay Round, supra note 63.
77. Id. arts. 1, 1.1(a)(1) (i).
78. Agreement on Government Procurement GATT Doc. GPR/Spec/77 (Dec. 15, 1993)
[hereinafter Procurement Agreement].
79. Id. art. III, § 1.
80. Id. § 2.
81. Id.
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simply emphasize that the rules of Section 1 apply especially against local
preferences? Or does it mean that local preferences are acceptable, pro-
vided that non-local national and international firms are penalized
equally? If so, how far can a preference extend before it loses its "local"
character? Can Toledo prefer goods from Cleveland? Ohio? The
Midwest?
Every country signing the Procurement Agreement specifically lists
"sub-central government entities" covered by the Agreement.8 2 The
United States affirms that twenty-four state governments acceded to cover-
age.83 Some states, such as California and Florida, only extend the rules
to "executive branch agencies," while others like Maryland and Penn-
sylvania enumerate each agency covered. 84 New York State lists its official
agencies, the state university system, and public authorities and public
benefit corporations, with the exception of those entities with multi-state
mandates.8 5 One implicit limit of the Procurement Agreement is that
unlisted states and state agencies, as well as local governments, are not
covered.8 6
The GATT procurement rules only apply to state contracts exceeding
$252,000 (355,000 SDRs) for supplies and services and $3.6 million (five
million SDRs) for construction.8 7 Where a public purchase "results in the
award of more than one contract, or in contracts being awarded in sepa-
rate parts," Article II suggests that the basis for valuation should be the
total value over a twelve-month period.88 A lease, rental, or hire should be
valued by multiplying the monthly installment by forty-eight.8 9
In an annex to its agreement to the GATT procurement rules, the
United States has placed several other limitations on their application to
listed state governments:90 First, they will not apply to nine states with pre-
existing restrictions concerning public procurement of construction-grade
steel, motor vehicles, and coal.91 Second, they will not cover restrictions
"associated with a mass transit or highway project that receives federal
funds."9 2
Third, the rules will not govern "[p ] rocurements subject to program-
mes promoting the development of distressed areas and businesses owned
82. Agreement on Government Procurement-Addendum, GATT Doc. GPR/74/Add.12,
annex 2, at 6 (Jan. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Procurement Addendum].
83. Id. at 6-10.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 8.
86. This has been confirmed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Tele-
phone Interview with Lori Sherman, Associate General Counsel, U.S.T.R. Office (Mar.
17, 1994).
87. Procurement Addendum, supra note 82, annex 2, at 6.
88. Procurement Agreement, supra note 78, art. II, § 4.
89. Id. § 5.
90. Procurement Addendum, supra note 82, at 10-11.
91. The designated states, marked with an asterisk in the list of those covered by the
Procurement Agreement, are Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. Id. at 6-10.
92. Id. at 11.
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by minorities, disabled veterans and women ... .93 State governments
can breathe a sigh of relief that their affirmative action programs will be
protected, but what about preferences for local businesses in general? In
theory, these kinds of preferences are permissible if they are part of a pro-
gram for economic revitalization, but it is unclear how broadly the WTO
or a court might define "development of distressed areas." The Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative argues that each state can define this term
as it wishes, 94 but a judge might turn to Article 8 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which defines what constitutes
acceptable "assistance to disadvantaged regions." 95 A state or local govern-
ment can only provide assistance that reduces disparities within its jurisdic-
tion, and a beneficiary area must not have a per capita income greater
than eighty-five percent of the regional average or an unemployment rate
greater than 110% of the regional average.96
Fourth, the United States will allow state procurement "restrictions
that promote the general environmental quality," provided they "are not
disguised barriers to international trade."9 7 As already noted, however,
the Agreements on SPS and on TBT would place many existing state and
local regulations on environmental protection in jeopardy as barriers to
trade.
E. Subsidies
Perhaps the most ominous new provisions of the GATT concern subsidies.
The Agreement on SCM covers not only government subsidies per se but
also government loans, loan guarantees, tax abatements, guaranteed
purchases, in kind contributions, and price supports. 98 One part of the
Agreement is relatively narrow, banning subsidies that are given "contin-
gent.., upon export performance" 9 9 or "contingent... upon" the use of
domestic over imported goods."10 0 Another part, however, broadly pro-
hibits subsidies that cause "injury to the domestic industry of another
Member," "nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members under the GATT [of] 1994," or "serious preju-
dice to the interests of another Member."1 1 "Serious prejudice" may be
found if ad valorem subsidization exceeds five percent, if subsidies cover
the operating losses of an industry or a firm (beyond a one-time bailout),
if the government forgives a debt, or if the effect of a subsidy is to "dis-
place or impede" the imports or exports of another Member or to create
"significant price undercutting."10 2 Since almost any subsidy can have
93. Id. at 10.
94. Telephone Interview with Lori Sherman, supra note 86.
95. Agreement on SCM, supra note 76, art. 8.2.
96. Id. art. 8.2(b).
97. Procurement Addendum, supra note 82, at 11.
98. Agreement on SCM, supra note 76, arts. 1.1(a) (1), (2).
99. Id. art. 3.1(b).
100. Id. art. 3.1(a).
101. Id. arts. 5.1(a), (b), (c).
102. Id. arts. 6.1, 6.3.
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some effect on foreign imports or exports, these provisions could eliminate
most state and local government involvement in the marketplace. The
requirement that each government ensure "the conformity of its laws, reg-
ulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agree-
ment"10 3 means that a Member is obligated to overrule contrary
provisions by state and local governments. The GATT therefore might
mean the end of any community ownership of factories, banks, stores, or
services.
F. Labelling
The Agreement on TBT covers not only technical regulations and stan-
dards but also packaging, marking, and labelling requirements.' 0 4 Com-
munity labelling practices that induce consumers to purchase local
products could be found to contravene the GATT's requirement that
"products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin and to like products originating in any other country." 10 5
Encouraging local production and consumption is not considered a legiti-
mate objective of regulation.
G. Local Currencies
The GATT also wipes out the possibility for communities to create their
own currencies. GATS states that "each Member shall accord to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers."10 6 A community-run
currency system could be interpreted as a banking service, especially since
"measures by members" is defined to include those taken by "central,
regional or local governments and authorities." 0 7 Since local currency
schemes envision a local government issuing currency or setting rules of
exchange to induce community members to buy local rather than interna-
tional goods and services, they could be construed as being discriminatory.
While GATS exempts government bodies supplying services "in the exer-
cise of governmental authority,"' 0 8 the Financial Services Annex defines
the financial services covered by GATS to include government-run "pay-
ment and money transmission services" and all trading of foreign
exchange.10 9
103. Id art. 32.4(a).
104. Agreement on TBT, supra note 68, pmbl.
105. Id. art. 2.1.
106. GATS, supra note 74, art. XVII, § 1. This provision is limited to "sectors
inscribed in [a signatory nation's] schedule." Id. For the U.S. schedule, see GATIT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev. 4.
107. GATS, supra note 74, art. I, § 3(a) (i).
108. I& art. I, § 3(b).
109. 1&, Annex on Financial Services, § 5.1(h), (j).
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H. Local Resource Conservation
The viability of community initiatives to promote the use of local resources
to achieve self-reliance would depend on the specific legal tools employed.
Under the original GATr Agreement, local prohibitions or taxes on
imports of resources are permissible provided they place equal burdens on
national and international resource suppliers. 110 Article 20 of the GATT
explicitly allows measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible nat-
ural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.""'1
However, subsidies or tax breaks for local resource producers as well
as for community ownership might be difficult under the Agreement for
SCM. Foreign aluminum or paper producers could challenge local subsi-
dization of a recycling program on the grounds that it was adversely effect-
ing exports. Canadian exporters of oil, gas, or electricity could attack
community conservation programs or publicly owned utilities. Foreign
food exporters might be able to convince U.S. courts to invalidate local
government expenditures designed to induce consumers to buy local
grains, fruits, and vegetables.
The only remaining options for U.S. communities eager to encourage
self-reliance on local resources are selective purchasing and investment by
local government. But a local government cannot regulate the origin of
resource inputs for private production. A requirement, for example, that
enterprises doing business in the jurisdiction use local resources would
violate the mandate of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures1 12 (TRIMs). This agreement forbids any laws which "require... the
purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from
any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in
terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of vol-
ume or value of its local production.... 113
I. Lobbying
In theory, the GAIT leaves communities free to lobby national and inter-
national bodies. In practice, however, the GATT eliminates much of the
leverage communities once had over trade policy. The option of lobbying
the national government is substantially divested since national decision-
makers now must either accept or reject the GATT regime as a whole,
including the rulings from the new WTO. Negotiating and maneuvering
room has been all but eliminated except at the international level, where
communities have little ability to influence decisions because the GAfT's
decision-making procedures lack the basic features of due process. Delib-
erations are undertaken in secret, outsiders are not allowed to participate
or file amicus briefs, and the institutions are completely dominated by cor-
110. GATT, supra note 1, art. 3.
111. Id. art. 20(g).
112. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Annex, GAIT Doc. M'TN/FA II-
A1A-7 (Dec. 15, 1993).
113. Id. annex § 1(b).
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porate interests. 114
Conclusion
No one can say for certain whether the GATE will be enforced in the oner-
ous ways suggested above. Like any statute, its provisions must be inter-
preted by courts and dispute-resolution bodies at the international,
national, and local levels. But if recent history is a reasonable guide to the
future, there are serious grounds for worry.
As the decision of the GAT Panel concerning the U.S. Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act underscores, those responsible for resolving trade dis-
putes often have little sympathy for the values of ecology or self-
determination. WTO decisionmakers, who are appointed on the basis of
their wholehearted embrace of neoliberal trade theories, may well be even
less sensitive to the interests of communities. Once a WTO Panel decides
that a national, state, or local law violates the GAT, the responsible
nation will have to repeal the law within sixty days, lest it suffer automatic
trade sanctions by the effected nations.
The GAIT also places affirmative obligations on the U.S. government
to pass legislation, issue regulations, and initiate lawsuits in order to force
state and local governments to bring their laws into compliance with the
GATr. Officials that fail to fulfill these obligations could be vulnerable to
citizen or corporate lawsuits compelling them to perform their legal
duties.
National and local courts may take the law into their own hands. In
the 1969 case of Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Commissioners,'15 for example,
the California Court of Appeals invalidated the state's "Buy American" Act,
which mandated that state and local government agencies purchase goods
and enter into contracts, if possible, with U.S. firms, partially on the
ground that it violated the GATT. There was no explicit language in the
GAT at that time that banned government purchasing preferences, no
special provisions in the national legislation that implemented the GAIT,
and no declarations by the President or the State Department that Buy
American Acts were contrary to U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the Califor-
nia court read between the lines of the treaty, genuflected to the princi-
ples of free trade, and wiped out the state law. It is not unreasonable to
foresee the possibility of courts throughout the world erring on the side of
free trade and interpreting the GAIT in ways unfavorable to communities.
If any U.S. president, senator, or representative proposed substan-
tially weakening state and local powers to regulate, zone, invest, contract,
tax, and spend in the ways that the GATT does, every governor, mayor,
and city council member would be on the phone, feverishly lobbying to
change minds. They would fly to Washington, make public speeches, rally
their citizens, lead demonstrations, and threaten to defeat anti-community
politicians at the polls. But because the effects of the GAIT are covert and
114. See, e.g., LANG & HINES, supra note 66.
115. 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
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uncertain, and because national politicians have been careful not to draw
attention to the anti-federalist consequences, the response at the local
level has been a deafening silence. One can probably count on two hands
the number of state or local officials with even the dimmest idea about the
GATT. The National Governors Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
and National League of Cities have been unable to move beyond uncriti-
cal boosterism of free trade.1 16
If communities are ever to have the powers to cope with globalization,
to create sustainable and self-reliant economies, and to govern in a mean-
ingful way, they will need to live the motto of the Clinton presidential
campaign: "It's the economy, stupid!" They must work quickly and effec-
tively, by themselves and in coalitions, to undo the Uruguay Round and to
expand their basic powers. If communities lobby, invest, contract, and
regulate wisely, they can force global corporations to rise to a higher stan-
dard and increase the likelihood of a strong corporate code of conduct
being adopted internationally. If they insist on creating their own eco-
nomic activity, anchored to the community through local ownership, they
can prevent capital from fleeing to the world's maquiladoras, strengthen
the security of local workers, and reduce the vulnerability of the commu-
nity to the unpredictable currents of the global economy.
It may be too late to convince Congress not to ratify the signed GATT
agreement, though a political fight may be brewing that will rival the
debate over the NAFrA. But it is not too late to shape the contours of the
federal legislation implementing the treaty.
To its credit, the Clinton Administration endorsed a provision prohib-
iting private parties from using the GATT as a cause of action or a defense
in U.S. courts. 117 It also inserted a requirement that the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative consult with a state or local government after its law is found
inconsistent with the GATT "in an effort to develop a mutually agreeable
response ... ."- 8 And the burden of proof lies with the government to
show "that the law that is the subject of the action, or the application of
that law, is inconsistent with the agreement in question. " 1 19
These provisions, however, provide only minor safety valves. Congress
needs to add language to narrow the circumstances under which state and
municipal regulations, investments, contracts, or subsidies will be consid-
ered barriers to trade. The states also might protect themselves by exercis-
ing their power to withdraw from the Agreement on Procurement.
But ultimately the U.S.T.R. has the ability to enter U.S. courts and
overturn state and local laws. This power of preemption represents a mas-
sive transfer of power from the states to the federal government (and from
the legislative to the executive branch). Moreover, provisions written into
116. The National League of Cities' resolution of support for NAMTA, which simply
assumes that free trade is in the interest of communities, is typical. National League of
Cities Resolution 94-7 (Dec. 5, 1993) (on file with the Comel! International Law Journal).
117. H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 102(c)(1) (1994).
118. Id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(iv).
119. Id. § 102(b) (2) (B) (ii).
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national implementing legislation protecting state and local sovereignty
could themselves be overturned by WTO rulings, which the U.S. govern-
ment then would be obliged to enforce.
The only long-term way to remedy these problems is to place the
interests of community, along with those of labor and the environment, at
the center of the next GAT round. The Clinton Administration must
push for a corporate code of conduct, clarify that labor and ecology stan-
dards should be floors and not ceilings for regulations, revamp the rules
concerning subsidies, labels, procurement, and investment, and democra-
tize the WTO.
Communities themselves have an important role to play in achieving
these objectives. All politics, as Tip O'Neill used to say, is local. A munici-
pality is the most accessible instrument for collective political expression,
where citizens are most likely to overcome the forces of corruption,
money, and apathy, and most likely to become democratically engaged.
Communities are also where people have the greatest ability to structure
their personal and professional relationships and where they can make the
most difference in improving the quality of their daily lives. Today
national leaders and international agreements wax religious about the
value of communities, but in practice they are willing to sacrifice them on
the altar of free trade. A fundamental goal for the GATT or any interna-
tional agreement must be to ensure that communities have sufficient
power to secure their own well-being. The new global economy must serve
communities, not vice-versa.
Communities no longer can wait for their national governments to
save them. They must work alongside labor, environmental, and con-
sumer groups to influence future negotiations of the GATT and other
global economic instruments. None of these struggles will be easy. But
the current strategy, really a non-strategy, in which communities continue
to bargain down their wages and environmental standards in a desperate
attempt to lure fickle corporations, is a guaranteed dead end.
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